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Motivation of financial institutions’ management to a crisis 
ATTILA ÁCS 
 
The recent financial and economic crisis highlighted the importance to better understand 
managers’ motivation and decision making process at financial institutions. There is direct 
relation between liquidity developments and asset price movements and these market 
developments influence the decision makers’ attitude and reaction. This interconnection can 
result in a vicious circle with devastating consequences for the financial system and real 
economy. 
Nowadays market-based institutions overtook the dominant role in the supply of credit 
from commercial banks. These market-based financial institutions were deeply involved in 
securitisation and actively used capital and financial markets to satisfy their funding needs. 
This changing nature of finance is well reflected by the aggregate balance sheet of market-
based financial intermediaries which in 2007 reached 17.000 trillion of dollars compared to 
commercial banks 13.000 trillion. This overwhelming role of broker-dealers, investment 
banks together with their risk and investment practices explains why the managerial decisions 
in this type of financial institutions have reaching consequences to the whole financial system 
and real economy. 
Main goal is to shed light on this management behavioural phenomenon on which 
today’s researchers and practitioners need to focus on to prevent the proliferation of overly 
risk taking. 
 
Keywords: crisis, risk, compensation scheme, leverage 
1. Introduction 
The primary goal of this paper is not to put the blame on financial managers for the financial 
crisis but to shed light on their motivating factors. There is plenty of literature dealing with 
the causes of the current situation but little attention has been paid to psychological aspects. 
Király et al (2008) provides an overview of the antecedents of the crisis emanating from 
the US sub-prime credit market. They conclude that the main drivers of the turmoil were a 
persistently low international interest rate environment and financial imbalances brought 
about by globalisation. The continuously rising house prices, the rapid increase of financial 
asset prices due to sub-prime mortgage credit securitisations (the originate-and-distribute 
model) and the crash of asset prices in the United States collectively were liable for the 
enormity of the economical distress. 
But to a very important feature of the events little attention was paid to: the financial 
institution managers’ and portfolio dealers’ motivation. The recent financial and economic 
crisis highlighted the direct relation between liquidity developments and asset price 
movements. These market developments are important inputs in decision making process and 
contribute to the general attitude and influence reactions. This interconnection between 
market developments and investors feelings can result in a vicious circle with devastating 
consequences for the financial system and real economy. 
First the financial landscape will be introduced as to understand the setting in which 
decision makers’ manoeuvre. Only the very necessary technical aspects will be treated which 
are indispensable to our topic. After the regulatory issues the “this time is different” belief is 
treated as beliefs and ignorance are key to understand dynamics. Before ending this paper 
with conclusions the compensation practice at financial institutions is going to be discussed 
and its effect. 
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2. The financial landscape 
To be aware of the financial landscape preceding the 2007-08 events is very helpful to 
understand financial managers’ motivation and decision making process. 
Classical financial institutions (commercial banks, saving houses, thrifts) make money 
by maturity transformation, that is they finance long term investments (house purchase) from 
short term sources (deposits). But from the 80’s so called market-based financial institutions 
(broker-dealers, investment banks, hedge funds) overtook the dominant role in the supply of 
credit from commercial banks. These market-based financial institutions were deeply 
involved in securitisation and actively used capital and financial markets to satisfy their 
funding needs. This changing nature of finance is well reflected by the aggregate balance 
sheet of market-based financial intermediaries which in 2007 reached 17.000 trillion of 
dollars compared to commercial banks 13.000 trillion (Adrian–Shin 2008). This 
overwhelming role of broker-dealers, investment banks together with their risk and 
investment practices explains why the managerial decisions in this type of financial 
institutions have far reaching consequences to the whole financial system and real economy 
too. 
Market-based financial institutions engage in very intense maturity transformation by 
buying long term assets on the capital markets (stocks, bonds, asset backed securities, credit 
default swaps, etc) and refinancing these assets from short term credits from the money 
markets. Money markets offer short term financing possibilities that is they lend money for 
one day or a couple of day. From this follows that investors have to refinance assets from time 
to time. Not surprisingly, refinancing conditions are vital to investors. 
On money markets the primary form on lending is the repurchase agreement (repo). In a 
repo contract the borrower sells a security today for a price below the current market price 
and will buy it back in the future at a pre-agreed price. The difference between the current 
market price of the security and the price at which it is sold is called the “haircut”. The 
variations of haircut largely determine the available funding to market participants, since the 
haircut determines the maximum potential leverage possible to borrowers. In case of 2% 
haircut, investors can borrow 98 dollars for 100 dollars worth of assets pledged, investing this 
way only 2 dollars of equity to hold 100 dollars worth of securities. Thus, in case of 2% repo 
haircut the greatest possible leverage (ratio of assets to equity) is 50 (Adrian–Shin 2009). 
The evolution of factors influencing liquidity conditions shows pro-cyclicality which 
means that liquidity is plenty when markets are calm and prices of assets are rising. In these 
conditions lenders feel safe from losses as they keep the collateral. The value of collateral in 
favourable conditions, when optimism is reigning, usually is rising. Volatility is low as 
investors are calm. Several other factors have influence on short term liquidity conditions and 
implicitly on balance sheets of financial institutions. As portfolio managers react to every 
change in asset and money market conditions balance sheets reflect all this adjustment. As a 
consequence investment banks aggregated balance sheets is a good proxy for general liquidity 
conditions (Adrian–Shin 2008). 
It is important to write about financial developments. Financial engineering created new 
highest qualified investment graded (AAA) assets which became eligible for repo. As the real 
value of these securities got questioned they lost their high level status and a haircut of 100% 
was applied to them. These papers became ineligible for refinancing in practice which put 
additional pressure on their prices. 
3. Regulation 
Investment companies, broker-dealers have to follow mark-to-market accounting rules to 
reflect the true and updated value of the balance sheets of financial institutions. It means that 
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these companies day-by-day have to update their balance sheet items. This methodology 
should allow investors and policy makers to better assess risk profiles and make corrective 
actions in financial regulations. Opponents of this accounting practice argue that mark-to-
market accounting leads to excessive and artificial volatility of market prices and balance 
sheets. As a consequence, short-term fluctuations have serious effects on the value of the 
balance sheets of financial institutions. This way an accounting rule drives markets instead of 
the fundamentals and the value at maturity of assets and liabilities (Allen–Carletti 2007). 
This mark-to-market accounting rule is exacerbated by value-at-risk (VaR) risk 
management. VaR is defined as a threshold value that the losses should not exceed in a given 
time period with a given confidence level. The main input in VaR values is the volatility of 
time series of daily equity returns. To put it simple, VaR is high when the market prices 
change with big amplitudes. In compliance with VaR risk management practice exposures are 
adjusted continuously to be matched with available capital, so to leave the probability of 
default constant. But market prices change in the same time for every financial investor which 
means that they have to de-leverage (sell assets) at the same time to contract their balance 
sheets. In other words, balance sheet must shrink or expand simultaneously to keep 
probability of solvency fixed over time. Thus, when after a shock the overall risks in the 
financial system increase, the intermediary must decrease its exposure in order to maintain the 
probability of default unchanged to additional arriving shocks. On the contrary, when the 
economic situation is more benevolent and anticipated risk declines, the financial companies 
will expand balance sheets by buying risky assets to keep the probability of default constant 
(Adrian–Shin 2008). 
From the above mentioned follows that the assets to capital ratio moves hand-in-hand 
with VaR. Intermediaries are buying risky assets when the risk measured by VaR is low and 
selling assets when measured risk is elevated. To put it in different way leverage is pro-
cyclical in the sense that leverage grows when balance sheets are expanding, and then 
contracts when balance sheets are shrinking (Adrian–Shin 2008). Figure 1 and figure 2 help to 
explain this relationship, between VaR, leverage and volatility, where the latter is represented 
by the VIX1 index. 
On Figure 1 the relationship between the equity of the 4 largest US investment bank, 
value of VaR (the ’06 May value set to unity) and S&P500 stock prices can be seen. Equity is 
responding not only to stock prices but VaR too and that is the reason that the value of banks 
equity can diverge from the course of stock prices. Obviously the change of equity can 
overreact the change of stock prices in benign conditions when VIX declining. 
On Figure 2 the countercyclical nature of connection of price volatility (VIX) and banks 
leverage ratio (lev) is visible. The effect of suddenly falling prices to leverage is dramatic in 
2008. The explanation is that crashing prices wiping out bank equity (Figure 1) faster than 
banks can adjust leverage to new conditions. Liquidity2 conditions were stressed from two 
main directions. First asset liquidity deteriorated on markets3. It means that when financial 
companies sell stock they want to exit the same door at the same time but simply enough 
buyers can be found only at markedly lower prices. The final consequence is devastating and 
demonstrated by leverage value. It has reached nearly 100 which imply that against equity of 
                                                 
1 The CBOE Volatility Index® (VIX®) is a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 
500 stock index option prices. Since its introduction in 1993, VIX has been considered by many to be the world's premier 
barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility. http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx 
2 About likuidity effect see Ács 2011. http://www.bankszovetseg.hu/anyag/feltoltott/HSZ_0311_5.pdf 
3 A market is liquid if transactions can take place rapidly and with little impact on price. So defined, market liquidity has 
several dimensions.20 Tightness refers to the difference between buy and sell prices, for example the bid-ask spread in a 
quote-driven market. Depth relates to the size of the transactions that can be absorbed without affecting prices. Immediacy 
denotes the speed with which orders can be executed, and resiliency the ease with which prices return to “normal” after 
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markets and got refinanced in repo transactions at a much lower haircut than otherwise would 
have been reasonable. 
The US Office for the Comptroller of the Currency from 2004 through 2007 provided 
timely warning. Tried draw attention to a) imprudent credit decision practices fostered by 
ambitious growth goals, b) the need of better credit risk management practices, c) the liability 
of managers for both the quality and the quantity of their deals, d) “the worst of loans are 
made in the best of times”, e) changing risk selection practices and underwriting standards, 
and emerging concentrations of risks, f) unsustainable appreciation of house prices and 
overvalued markets, g) increasing credit risk due to weakening of underwriting standards 
(IMF 2009b). 
Rajan (2009) is pointing to cyclical euphoria. It is not completely surprising that bad 
investments are done in good times. But what was astonishing was that the originators of 
securities with questionable values held in their own portfolios so many of them. At least the 
financial institutions should have understood the deterioration of the underlying quality of 
assets (mortgage backed securities, MBS). The justification has to be that somebody in these 
financial institutions considered these securities worth of investment. Buying mortgage 
backed securities seemed to be became part of an investment culture characterised by 
excessive risk-taking. To timely recognise this abnormality, it is extremely difficult, 
especially in the case of new products (Rajan 2009). As these assets were widely accepted in 
repo at a relatively low haircut indeed they were attractive. 
Another issue is related to performance evaluation. To judge whether a financial 
manager is generating real risk adjusted excess returns or whether the current returns are 
simply compensation for an uncovered risk that can later materialize is a tough task. In 
addition head of financial companies are evaluated in part on the basis of the earnings they 
generate relative to their peers. This is a very competitive business and the pressure is always 
high to generate high returns. To managers of follower banks have no option but to engage in 
risky investments to improve various observable measures of performance. Even if they 
recognize the doubtfulness of this type of strategy, the temptation to increase their bank’s 
stock prices and their own reputation is a strong appeal. There is anecdotal evidence of this 
type of managerial attitude. The most frequently cited is the chief executive officer of 
Citigroup, Chuck Prince. In his infamous sentence gave explanation why Citigroup continued 
the same investment practice to buy assets from credit despite rising risks: “When the music 
stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But, as long as the music is playing, 
you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” (Rajan 2009). 
This “dance” is highlighted on Figure 3, where the simultaneous development of 
S&P500 stock index and market volatility (VIX) is observable. Nicely discernible is a change 
in the relationship between S&P500 and VIX from 2002 onwards. Volatility was diminishing 
and stock prices were kept on rising. VIX reached its bottom in 2006q4 but stock prices were 
rising for an addition half year. Liquidity conditions changed in response to varying volatility 
and asset prices. When both were deteriorating liquidity conditions answered in accordance 
by rising haircuts and shrinking number of eligible assets. Then the stock index bottomed and 
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sound compensation practices in large financial institutions (IMF 2009c, Basel-BIS 2010). 
Supervisors may have to to include compensation schemes to their general review of risk-
management and governance at financial companies. New so called best practices would be 
introduced at international level to make compensation structure more risk based and 
consistent with the long-term objective of maintaining the company as a going concern. The 
most logical first step is to stop paying bonuses from annual results and short-term indicators. 
In this sense deferred pay-outs should be introduced and enough time should be left for 
potential risk to realise. An alternative choice is to make compensation conditional on 
medium-term return on assets rather than equity price of the financial institution. This way the 
bias to create leverage when volatility is low and economical future looks bright could be 
dampened (IMF 2009a). 
6. Conclusions 
This writing intentionally took into consideration only the most relevant technical issues 
pertinent to out topic. The author’s intention with this short paper is to shed light on soft 
issues like psychological factors and compensation schemes and their role in financial 
developments. The shortcomings of the financial system create incentives for investment 
managers and chairmen for crisis. Undoubtedly these peoples do not want to generate 
financial meltdown but there is the temptation. This temptation is incarnated in short-term 
measurement of success and fierce competition between investment companies. This structure 
is built on money but interestingly portfolio managers and decision makers rarely risk their 
own wealth. They play a win-win game and in worst case they do not get the year-end bonus 
but their unresponsive strategy brings about externalities in the real economy. The answer at 
first glimpse seems simple: stop concentrating only on short term performance measurement 
and have a longer term investment horizon. But unfortunately it has been proved several times 
that the creativity of the financial world is limitless and financial regulators lag behind 
markets. 
Regulators and policy makers have to be ready to stifle affluent psychological factors. What 
really creates an explosive blend (“this time is different”) of factors is their pro-cyclicality and 
co-movement. The source of the liquidity glut in the run-up to the crises was the “collateral 
bubble” originating from the pro-cyclicality of the financial word. In the years preceding the 
financial crisis security markets were characterised by inflated prices as the real value of the 
securities deviated away from fundamental values. Spreads narrowed, market uncertainty 
measured by volatility remained low, refinancing was cheap and plenty by repurchasing 
agreements. The range of assets eligible for collateral (warranty) in refinancing operations 
widened and these collaterals were refinanced close to 100 percent (Gorton–Metrick 2010). 
As broker-dealers’ balances on paper remained strong maturity transformation intensified 
creating an inextricable relationship between different market participants. 
In theory compensation deficiencies have been recognised and widely dealt with. Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) formulated effective alignment of compensation with prudent 
risk-taking and effective supervisory oversight and engagement by stakeholders. Not only the 
firm’s directors must actively oversee the compensation system’s design and operation but 
relevant board members and employees must have independence and proficiency in risk 
management and compensation (Basel-BIS 2010). Hopefully these changes will be effective. 
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